

# **“Coming to Africa: Should Black Americans Emigrate?”**

**by**

Brooks B. Robinson, Ph.D.  
<http://www.blackeconomics.org/>

National Economics Association Session: African Development and African  
Immigration

Prepared for the 2008 American Economic Association Conference  
in  
New Orleans, Louisiana  
January 4 - 6, 2008

JEL Codes: F22; J15; J61; N33; O15; O19; and O55

Key Words: Africa; Discrimination; Economic Development; Emigration; European  
History; Human Resources; Labor; Prisons; European History

©Brooks B. Robinson  
November 2007  
Honolulu, HI

## Introduction

In 1988, comedian Eddie Murphy created quite a stir and considerable good fortune for himself with the movie “Coming to America,” which concerned an African emigrating to America. The title of this paper is a spoof on that movie because the paper inquires about prospects for Black Americans emigrating to Africa. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it appears appropriate to entertain critical analyses of future prospects for Black Americans. Historically, many Black Americans (a separately identifiable group of around 40 million—a nation within a nation) have turned to the continent of Africa as a spiritual, if not mythical, home—the land of our ancestors. In fact, during the two and one-half centuries of chattel slavery in America, many Blacks sought to escape America, and, in many cases, their destination was Africa (Yarema, 2006). Today, although millions of Black Americans are enjoying the benefits of selective filtering facilitated by Affirmative Action-type programs and/or their own genius, millions more are suffering in poverty or as “vulnerables” on the edge of poverty (Robinson 2007B). Given trends in America and the world, events could unfold that would place both of these groups in precarious circumstances. In case ethnic troubles surface and escalate, to where should Black Americans run? Who will accept them? A quick study of history will reveal that, like economies, history has cycles and the unthinkable and unspeakable occur from time-to-time. Consequently, Black Americans might benefit greatly from the development of a long-term strategic plan that would help prevent such circumstances and provide guidance in case they occur.

This paper seeks to help move economic analyses by Black economists beyond the descriptive to the prescriptive. It seeks to open a discussion about the future of Black America, beginning with a set of questions that have lingered in the backs of many of our minds for a very long time. “Should we go back to Africa? Under which circumstances should we return? Would we be accepted? If not Africa, then where?” These questions have been written about in a variety of contexts. I will not attempt to uncover all of them here, nor is it necessary to do so. It is necessary, however, to consider relatively contemporary writings on these questions in an attempt to synthesize evidence-based and meaningful answers. Consequently, I have used mainly readily available information that swirls around on the ubiquitous Internet in this effort.

I suspect that this paper will draw criticisms. Indeed, such criticisms are welcome because they will help Black Americans begin to develop a systematic and forward-leaning discussion, which will have significant import for generations to come. We do not need to build “a bridge to nowhere,” but a “roadmap to somewhere.” Without doubt, our discussion of this topic today will have an important impact on outcomes for Black Americans tomorrow.

The plan for this paper is to first discuss incentives for Black emigration. Second, we consider emigration destinations—mainly Africa. Third, we discuss an experiment that could provide invaluable insights about Black American emigration. Fourth, we consider the development of a long-term strategic plan that could include Black American

emigration as an element. Finally, we inquire about appropriate timing for such emigration.

### Why Emigrate?

A little known emigration statistic is that less than 20,000 native born Americans emigrate each year and establish permanent homes elsewhere. (Gibbs et al, 2001) It is informative to compare this estimate with the most liberal of estimates of the total number (20,000) of Black Americans who set sail for Africa from 1817 to 1892 under the American Colonization Society program (Yarema, 2006). Nevertheless, such a seemingly small number of emigrating Americans implies a high level of satisfaction with the economic, political, and social conditions in this country. In fact, the relatively small number of American émigrés stands in contradistinction to the actual perception of conditions in this country. The pollster Gallup reported for the week ending October 12, 2007 that the “State of the Country” satisfactory rating was: 28 percent satisfied and 71 percent dissatisfied. Similarly, 31 percent of Gallup Poll respondents expressed confidence in the nation’s economy, while 69 percent gave the economy a fair/poor rating. (These polls were taken during the period September 14-16, 2007.<sup>1</sup>) Why are more Americans not seeking more favorable environs? To the extent that the Gibbs et al’s (2001) estimate reflects reality, then the answer lies in the fact that certain Americans are yet to recognize that labor is truly mobile in our globalized world. Admittedly, the Internet makes it possible to live almost anywhere while remaining in close touch with almost anyone—including colleagues in a work relationship. However, while much of the rest of the world appears to understand our new globalized world and are quick to immigrate, certain Americans seem to have not caught up. Economic circumstances are likely to force an awakening on this front for Americans and many may be motivated to relocate beyond our borders to find meaningful employment. On the other hand, it could be, and is the case for many, that Americans continue to perceive that the United States remains the most favorable place to live in the world.

Why should Black America’s answer to the emigration question be different? Because, on the whole, Black Americans are unlike the rest of America. Let us provide selected and important examples of Black American differences. Proportionally, Black Americans suffer more poverty, experience higher rates of incarceration, incur some of the worst health outcomes, reflect double the rate of unemployment of any other group in America (this is a nearly forty-year, documented phenomenon), face rampant racial discrimination, and, as a result of our history, have been conditioned to turn inward to express our frustration and learned self-hate more than any other group in the nation (Robinson, 2007B). These are just a few, statistically-based, reasons why Black Americans might be interested in *Quitting America* as suggested by Randall Robinson (2005). These reasons, of course, do not include the history of brutality that Black Americans have faced; a brutality, that may be exacerbated by the fact that Black

---

<sup>1</sup> These Gallup Poll results are from “The Gallup Poll Weekly Briefing—October 12, 2007. The full reports on “State of the Country” and on “Economic Confidence” are available at <http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1669> and at <http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1609>, respectively.

Americans did not “take” their freedom. (Is it not logical that slaves who take their freedom are much more likely to be respected--even feared--by their former masters than slaves who are emancipated?)

Add to all of this the realization that America has already begun to experience a significant diminution in her status as the world’s only super power. It is clear to economists that this nation’s economic influence in the world is waning as the economic sun continues to rise in the east (The Economist, 2007). If U.S. economic super power status continues to dissipate, then certain Black Americans may find it to be in their best interest to seek their economic fortunes elsewhere.

Now consider adding a “fear factor.” Let us assume for the sake of argument that America experiences an intensification of economic misfortunes; e.g., a perennially weakening dollar, rising inflation, severe uncertainty in security and credit markets, and resource-absorbing natural disasters.<sup>2</sup> As students of how scarce and valuable resources are distributed, economists are best positioned to predict outcomes when resources become scarce; i.e., economists can predict who will eat and who will be cannibalized. Given the media’s prolific, effective, and stereotypical portrayal of Black Americans, especially Black males, as non-contributing and even destructive members of society, it does not take a rocket scientist to predict who is likely to be ostracized or worse if resources become scarce. Under such circumstances, economic agents are likely to ask, “Why should Black Americans be permitted to consume resources (water, food, energy, etc.)? What have ‘they’ contributed?” Under such circumstances, the best place for Blacks may be outside of the United States.<sup>3</sup>

From a purely economic perspective, Black Americans have limited economic ties to this nation. According to the Federal Reserve Board’s *2004 Survey of Consumer Finances*, median Black household net worth is \$29,670 compared with \$142,700 for White Americans. By today’s standard, Black median household net worth is less than a year’s mean earned income of \$39,385 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2005). Considering Black businesses, according to the 2002 Census Bureau Economic Census report on Black-Owned Enterprises, the mean value of gross receipts for all of these enterprises was less than \$74,000. Even if we assumed an implausibly high average net return of 50 percent (i.e., approximately \$37 thousand), it becomes clear that Blacks would experience no loss of great fortune personally or business-wise if they decided to emigrate to other nations.

On the other hand, relative to many parts of the world, Black Americans embody a considerable amount of wealth and human capital. Beyond just formal education, Black Americans have witnessed, and have contributed significantly to, the building of America. Therefore, Black Americans comprehend how democratic societies should be

---

<sup>2</sup> This sequence of outcomes characterizes recent experiences in the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Lest we forget, the Economist (2007) cites Philip Jenkins in reminding us of what can happen when resources become severely constrained and when competition for those resources is between different social groups; viz. the “little ice age” at the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, which caused divergent religious groups to turn violently against each other.

constructed and function—from physical, to legal, to social aspects. This tacit knowledge of nation-building, along with Black Americans' deep-seated respect for human freedoms, constitute human and social capital that might be welcomed elsewhere in the world—particularly in places where people are engaged in a nation rebuilding effort.

These are just a few reasons why Black Americans might determine that emigration represents a viable option. Is this smoke blowing? Today, what are prospects that Black Americans would actually emigrate. This is a valid question that deserves an answer. An evidenced-based response was developed from a fall 2007 survey of Black American students at over 70 institutions of higher learning (see Appendix A for background information on the BlackEconomics.org Emigration Survey). Who better to answer the question than Blacks students who have an extended life expectancy and who are being trained to function as rational economic agents in our world of tomorrow? Survey data tabulations and Logit regression results are presented below.

Table 1.—BlackEconomics.org Emigration Survey Results<sup>4</sup>

Line No.	Variables	Number of respondents	Percentage of respondents
<b>All respondents</b>			
1	Total respondents	76	100%
2	Number of colleges and universities responding	6	na
<b>Black Americans respondents</b>			
3	Number of Black American citizen respondents	72	100%
4	Number of males	17	23.6%
5	Number of females	55	76.4%
6	Estimated mean age	24.5	na
7	Estimated median age	20	na
8	Had traveled abroad	41	56.9%
9	Those who would never emigrate	18	25%
10	Those who would emigrate permanently	14	19.4%
11	Those who would emigrate temporarily	65	90.3%
12	Top three cited reasons for emigrating	Work, educational, and culturally expanding opportunities	na
13	Top three cited emigration destination (continent or country)	Europe, Africa, and South America	na

<sup>4</sup> Although e-mail solicitation efforts are known to incur low response rates, it was still quite disappointing to receive only 76 responses from a solicitation effort that encompassed over 70 of the nation's colleges and universities. The following factors may account for, in part, this outcome: Black student organizations are now closely linked to institutional bureaucracies that encumber their ability to act; Black student organizations may be poorly organized or are focused on matters unrelated to providing information via an e-mail survey—even when certain incentives are extended; Black students may continue to harbor traditional fears about providing even seemingly innocuous information to an unfamiliar party.

In an effort to assess factors that might contribute to a decision to emigrate, the following limited dependent variable (logit) equations were estimated using data from the BlackEconomics.org Emigration Survey.

**Equation 1**

$$\ln \frac{D_{N,P,T}}{1 - D_{N,P,T}} = \frac{I}{1 + e^{-[\sum_{i=1}^4 \beta_{1-4} Age_{1-4} + \beta_5 Gender + \beta_6 Travel + \sum_{j=1}^2 \beta_{7-8} I Rank_{1-2} + \sum_{m=1}^3 \beta_{9-11} Region_{1-3} + \varepsilon]}}$$

Where D is a binary dummy dependent variable that assumed the value 1 when respondents reported a willingness to emigrate never (N), permanently (P), or temporarily (T), and 0 otherwise; Age is a set of binary variables that assumed the value 1 if a respondent indicated an age in one of four age ranges (23-30, 31-40, 41-50, and 51-65—the omitted age range was 18-22), and 0 otherwise; Gender is a binary variable that assumed the value one if the respondent was female, and 0 otherwise; Travel is a binary variable that assumed the value 1 if the respondent had traveled outside of the United States, and 0 otherwise; I Rank (institution rank) is set of binary variables that assumed the value 1 if a respondent indicated attendance at an elite college or university or at a junior college (the omitted institution type was a state-owned college or university), and 0 otherwise; and Region is a set of binary variable that assumed the value 1 if the respondent reported attendance at a college or university in the east, south, or western regions of the United States (the omitted region was the mid-west), and 0 otherwise

It was hypothesized that increasing age would be inversely correlated with the probability of a willingness to emigrate; female gender would reduce the probability of a willingness to emigrate; having traveled abroad would increase the probability of willingness to emigrate; attendance at an elite college or university would increase the probability of a willingness to emigrate vis-à-vis attendance at state-owned institutions of higher learning, while the opposite would be true of attendance at junior colleges; and that attendance (an imperfect proxy for residence) at a college or university in the east and west would increase the probability of a willingness to emigrate vis-à-vis attendance at a Midwestern college or university, while the reverse would characterize attendance at a college or university in the south.

Given high multicollinearity in the survey data, three equations were derived from Equation 1, which were estimated for each of the three (never (N), permanent (P), or temporary (T) emigration) dependent variables.

Tables A2-A4 (see Appendix A) provide results from the logit regressions. While the models have limited overall explanatory power as measured by McFadden R-square statistics, the following statistically significant relationship was identified, which was consistent with the above-stated hypotheses: The coefficient for students in the 23-30 age range reflected a negative correlation with the ratio of the odds that they would

emigrate temporarily (Table A4, Model A). On the other hand, the following statistically significant relationships were observed from the regression results, which were inconsistent with the aforementioned hypotheses: The coefficient for students who had traveled abroad reflected a negative correlation with the ratio of the odds that they would emigrate permanently (Table A3, Models A and B); and the coefficient for gender reflected a positive correlation with the ratio of the odds that female students would be more apt to emigrate on a temporary basis relative to males (Table A4, Models A, B, and C).

Given that the data sample and institutional coverage is limited and that the data were not derived from a statistical probability sample, no broad inferences can be drawn from the survey results. However, it is appropriate to conclude from the data and the regression results that a majority of respondents would be willing to emigrate on a temporary basis for a variety of reasons. In addition, the ratio of the odds of a willingness to emigrate permanently was reduced if students had traveled abroad; and the ratio of the odds of a willingness to emigrate temporarily declined for at least one class of “older” students (ages 23-30), but increased if students were female versus male.

### **Emigrate Where?**

Actually, Denmark Vesey was not the first to attempt to transport Blacks outside of United States, including to the African continent (Woodson 1968). Black Americans who had fought along-side the British during the Revolutionary War were guaranteed safe passage back to Africa should the war be lost. While some of these Blacks’ return to Africa was delayed via a sojourn in Nova Scotia, they ultimately found their way back to Africa (Galabuzi, 2006). However, Vesey’s efforts sparked various and idiosyncratic returns of Black American slaves to Africa. It was a logical response for White Americans to support this effort after events such as the Turner and Brown uprisings during the early 19<sup>th</sup> century (Woodson, 1968). In fact, a major organized effort to return Black Americans to Africa *en masse* by the American Colonization Society (ACS) was at its peak during the 1830s and 1840s and continued on a less vigorous basis until the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Yarema, 2006).

Over the course of the nearly 80 years that the ACS operated, around 20,000 Black Americans were returned to various locations mainly along Africa’s western coast. Many more former slave and free Blacks would have likely returned to African had the cost of returning not been prohibitive. Africa continues to feel the effects of this reverse migration today; e.g., Liberia is just beginning to reassemble its nation after a bloody civil war that was sparked mainly by political and economic differences between indigenous Liberians and descendants of free and Black slaves from America.

In the previous section, we discussed Black American students’ proclivity to cite Africa as a likely destination for temporary emigration. Interestingly, over half (slightly over 57 percent) of those students who indicated a willingness to emigrate on a permanent or temporary basis had actually traveled outside of the United States. Consequently,

these students' general willingness to emigrate may be based, in large measure, on an informed perspective of the world beyond U.S. borders.

While there may be many good reasons to emigrate to an African nation, U.S. mainstream media present a continuous flow of bad news concerning Africa and Africans.<sup>5</sup> For example, Black Americans might be dissuaded somewhat from considering Africa as an emigration destination due to the anemic economies of many nations, the high prevalence of HIV AIDS in certain nations, political instability, recurring civil wars, and even genocide. While one must always be cautious about the accuracy of media reports, there is no question that Africa has more than its share of what would be viewed as unfavorable conditions by a citizen of the United States. In spite of these "troubles," *The New York Times* reports that Africans, themselves, are hopeful.

"Despite a thicket of troubles, from deadly illnesses like AIDS and malaria to corrupt politicians and deep-seated poverty, a plurality of Africans say they are better off today than they were five years ago and are optimistic about their future and that of the next generation..." (Polgreen and Connelly, 2007).

Nevertheless, if one were intent on emigrating to Africa, then one faces the question, "Which nation on the continent offers the most favorable conditions? One approach to answering this question is to perform an analysis of all 52 African nations, and to develop a relative ranking of these nations based on what might be considered important factors to consider when undertaking an emigration decision. Based on models of composite index construction available from the Conference Board (2000), weighted and unweighted "Favorable for Emigration Ranking" (FER) were developed on a nation-by-nation basis using statistics that are available in the *African Statistical Yearbook 2006* (2006), in Lawrence, Meigh, and Sullivan's (2003) *The Water Poverty Index: An International Comparison*, and on a measure of democracy as reflected in an index of democratization that is available from the Finnish Social Science Data Archive (2007) (see Appendix B for full details on the construction of the FERs). The FERs are designed to reflect recent (the most recent five-to-six years for which data are available) improvements in variables that produce favorable economic and political conditions in which to live, not the actual levels that are associated with such variables.

Variables: (1) per capita gross domestic product; (2) per capita food production; (3) electricity production; (4) telephones in use; (5) inflation (as reflected in the Consumer Price Index); (6) per capita central government surplus-deficit; (7) per capita external debt; (8) per capita Level 1 teachers; (9) percentage of population ages 15-49 living with AIDS; (10-12) water

---

<sup>5</sup> It is instructive that five "negative" stories about Africans and African nations were observed from sporadic reading of *The New York Times* over a seven-day period alone during the month of October 2007. The titles of these stories were: "Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War" (October 7<sup>th</sup>); "U.S. Envoy Laments 'Poisonous' Atmosphere Dividing Sudan"(October 7<sup>th</sup>) ; "Immigration, Black Sheep and Swiss Rage" (October 8<sup>th</sup>); "In Africa, Prosperity From Seeds Falls Short" (October 10<sup>th</sup>); and "As Angola Rebuilds, Most Find Their Poverty Persists"(October 10<sup>th</sup>).

resources, access, and use; and (13) an index of democratization that reflects political competition and participation in each country.

The weighted FER estimates point to the following 10 African nations as being the most favorable for emigration: **Madagascar**, Tunisia, **Guinea**, Cote d'Ivoire, **Cameroon**, Algeria, **Lesotho**, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Egypt.

The unweighted FER estimates point to the following 10 African nations as being the most favorable for emigration: Congo, Togo, Botswana, South Africa, **Madagascar**, Comoros, **Lesotho**, **Guinea**, Burkina Faso, and **Cameroon**.

African nations that appear in both the top 10 weighted and unweighted FERS are: **Cameroon**, **Guinea**, **Lesotho**, and **Madagascar**.

The nations appearing in either of the top 10 rankings, especially those in the overlap set, represent the best that Africa had to offer as destinations for prospective émigrés—at least as of 2004/2005. Over the past two years, important economic, political, and cultural developments have undoubtedly changed the relative FERs of certain nations. It is important to note that the FERs estimated for the United States is lower than that for 17 and 35 African nations on a weighted and unweighted basis, respectively (see Tables B.2 and B3 in Appendix B). Again, it is important to reiterate that the FERs reflect improvement or growth in variables that signal favorable conditions for emigration—not the levels of the variables. In other words, while the United States may reflect higher levels for these variables, the growth or improvement in these variables is slower for the United States than for certain African nations. Given the U.S. FERs, it is important to keep in mind that this paper is not designed to produce a decision concerning Black Americans emigrating to Africa—or to any nation for that matter. Rather, it is intended to help stare the facts in the face and to use those facts in the context of a long-term strategic plan on which to base decisions about emigration.

One other important factor about Africa that is becoming increasingly apparent, but that is not reflected in the FERs, is the mushrooming role of China. China's breakneck economic growth is fed, to a significant degree, not only by basic material inputs that are imported from African nations, but also by China's investments in those nations (French and Polgreen, 2007 A and B). While some Africans view China's role in their countries as a new form of colonialism, apparently many Africans derive great benefit from economic relations with China. In the context of the Black American emigration question, the role of China in Africa serves as a complicating factor that might reduce prospects for such emigration in certain African nations.

Let us not leave this section without recognizing that the question about Black American emigration is somewhat rhetorical because Blacks have already begun this process in small numbers. We have already mentioned Randall Robinson's dramatic quitting of America. However, he is only one of many Blacks who have already decided that America would no longer be their home. Whether as a result of their military, employment, or academic experiences, Black Americans already reside in nations

around the world. I recall my surprise when strolling around Stockholm during the summer of 2002 to find a Black American living happily there with his family. I was also slightly stunned to hear from a colleague that he knew Black Americans who had set up housekeeping in the cold climes of Finland. Therefore, the question is not whether emigration will ensue; it is a question of when larger numbers of Black Americans will seek new nations and cultures within which to live.

The issue of Black Americans emigrating may seem somewhat innocuous and it may have benefited from the fact that so few Black Americans have actually emigrated. However, the reality is that most nations do not view immigration favorably—especially when the émigrés are from different cultures. A recent report from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007) entitled *World Publics Welcome Global Trade – But Not Immigration* reflects the opinions of 45,000 survey respondents from 47 nations. As the title makes clear, citizens in these nations seek the benefits of globalization through trade, but they fear the threats to culture and to their environments that accompany that globalization; they also fear, very much, threats posed by immigration.

### **An experiment for Africa and Black (African) Americans**

The foregoing notwithstanding, a question remains: “How should Black Americans emigrate to Africa?” Important, related questions include: “Should Black elites emigrate first and prepare the way for others? Should Blacks dispose of all of their assets before leaving America and transfer their wealth to the nation(s) to which they emigrate?” Again, a deliberately-derived answer to these questions should surface from an effort to develop a long-term strategic plan for Black Americans.

It is important to recognize that emigration *en masse* is difficult to envision; the transportation and resettlement expenses alone are likely to be prohibitive for most would-be émigrés. Moreover, emigration is likely to be more successful the greater is the extent to which émigrés have invested in building the required human and cultural capital (appropriate occupational and cultural training—including language—to meet economic and cultural demands in the new country). Again, such investments may be beyond the means of certain would-be émigrés.

Therefore, assuming that a decision were made to do so, as a prospective precursor to significant Black emigration to Africa, it may be worthwhile to consider an experiment. This experiment would provide invaluable insights concerning the costs and likely successes of a massive emigration undertaking by Black Americans. The experiment that is proposed here reflects certain historical precedence. Specifically, the experiment calls for permitting certain Black Americans who are incarcerated to emigrate to African nations that request, and can benefit significantly from, their presence. Historical precedence for such immigration can be found in the American and Australian Colonies of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries.

The fact of the matter is that, for the British, “The planting of the colonies with convicts was an element in nearly all plans and proposal for empire” (Smith, 1965; p. 92). Up

until the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, convicts provided relatively responsible and high-quality labor in the American Colonies for an extended period of indentured servitude (usually seven years). These convicts were the source of a considerable amount of essential production. Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas were among the colonies that benefited most from the transport of convict labor (Smith 1965).

In the case of Australia, the transport of convict labor during the 18<sup>th</sup> century provided the human capital that enabled the survival of certain colonies. Notably, Nicholson and Shergold (1989) argue that the convicts that were transported to New South Wales, for example, possessed a production skill-set that paralleled that existing among the population in England. They add that these convicts were better educated (in terms of general literacy) than their fellow citizens back home.

Unfortunately, history has not always been objective in recording the contribution of convict labor to the economic and cultural development of the United States and Australia. By definition, there was a “criminal” element among the transported convicts. However, the types and definitions of crimes for which certain convicts were sentenced and imprisoned in England appear as cruel and unusual punishment by today’s standards (Smith 1965). While there is no denying that certain transported convicts continued their life of crime in the colonies, there is also agreement that the colonies needed and benefited greatly from much of the convict labor while transport was permitted (Smith 1965). It is this latter conclusion that sparked consideration of permitting certain incarcerated Black Americans an opportunity to be transported to different lands for a fresh start in life.

If Black American leadership (in the triple helix of academic, industry, and government) would nurture this idea, the lives of many Black male prisoners would be inverted upward and made fruitful; otherwise the latter will rot in a highly recidivistic system that ensures that they remain forever dependent on American taxpayers. Today, 2.25 million Americans are incarcerated and the nation has spent around over \$200 billion in recent years to house and maintain prisoners (U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 2007). During this period, Blacks accounted for nearly 40 percent of the total incarcerated population (Robinson, 2007A); i.e., it is estimated that nearly 900 thousand Blacks are incarcerated.<sup>6</sup> The sad fact is that, according to a study by Hughes and Wilson (2003), recent trends show that well over 60 percent of all released state prisoners are rearrested within three years. To place all of this in context, Director of the California Vera Institute for Justice Michael Jacobson (2007) provides a most concise, yet harrowing statement:

“The fact is that almost all [of] the extant research points out that our prison system is too big, too expensive, drains funds away from other essential areas that can more effectively increase public safety, and is harmful to our poorest communities.” (Jacobson, 2007; p. 7)

---

<sup>6</sup> In contrast, Black Americans constitute approximately 14 percent of the U.S. population.

To enhance prospects for the success of a plan to transport incarcerated Black Americans to Africa, the following four steps should be considered:

1. Developing a plan for identifying human resource needs in African nations, for training incarcerated persons to fulfill those needs, for an infrastructure that would facilitate the transport and resettlement of these persons, and for the legal framework that would create incentives and constraints for such an undertaking.
2. Identifying those African nations that—due to disease, wars, disasters, or just to build—would benefit from an influx of Black Americans who were incarcerated. Determine the human resources that are required by these nations that can be supplied within the context of the aforementioned plan.
3. Using the best available techniques/methods for identifying Black male and female prisoners who are most likely to succeed in such a transport and relocation effort.
4. Preparing Black American prisoners for transport and resettlement through training programs that include occupational skills, culture, language, and entrepreneurship training.

There are apparent and tremendous economic and human benefits that could be reaped from adopting this strategy for thinning out the American prison population. If only ten percent of Black American incarcerated persons were selected for an initial round of such a program (around 90 thousand), and if the total cost of selection, preparation, transportation, and resettlement could be constrained to \$95 thousand per prisoner, then the total cost for the first wave of prison émigrés would be around \$8.5 billion. This may appear to be a hefty price to pay for an experiment. However, when one considers that the nation spends around \$70 thousand to build each new prison cell and around \$25 thousand each year to supervise and maintain each prisoner (Marable, 2001) then the long-term savings that are derivable from such a transport and resettlement program are in plain view.

For some time now, the Rev. Jesse Jackson has advocated investment on the “front-side of life” to build hope as opposed to payments on the “back-side of life” to house and maintain prisoners.<sup>7</sup> America has failed to heed his plea and the nation has experienced a rapid escalation in the number of incarcerated persons over the past decade. Will America be wise and venture to attempt this or a similar experiment? Black leadership should not stand on the sidelines on this issue, but should explore the possibility of permanently improving the lives of thousands of Black Americans using the above-described strategy. If the leadership determines that the strategy has merit, then they should lobby vigorously and vociferously for its implementation.

---

<sup>7</sup> It is worth noting that Nobel Laureate economist James Heckman has also been a forceful advocate of this strategy (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2005).

## The Need for a Long-Term Strategic Plan for Black America

Ultimately, this paper concerns motivating the development of a long-term strategic plan for Black America. *The Covenant with Black America* (Smiley, 2006) is a valiant attempt to develop goals and a short-term roadmap for Black America. However, it failed in one important respect because, to my knowledge, not one Black economist was included in the panel that developed the covenant. Given the economic nature of today's world and the relatively weak economic outcomes experienced by many Black Americans, we can least afford to plan without accounting for the essential economic nature of life as we know it. More importantly, the standard *modus operandi* for nations of the world today is to develop 75-to-100 year plans. As a nation within a nation, can we afford to not do likewise?

The great and late Black American Historian, Professor John Henrik Clarke, said of Black Americans:

We have forgotten state formation. Entrepreneurship is part and parcel of the state and we have forgotten state formation and management. If you forget how to run a state, then you will forget how to run a candy store. One thing relates to the other. If the mind can conceive of one, then it can conceive of the other. (Clarke)

This paper invites Black Americans, particular economists, to join the process of planning for state formation. This proverbial nation of Black Americans would benefit tremendously from recognizing the practicality of doing so. As Black Americans continue to migrate south, and if America becomes more fragmented (e.g., California is often called a separate nation in jest), the opportunity may present itself for Black Americans to form their own state inside or outside of America. It can all begin with a long-term strategic plan. While such a development may be viewed as a reversal of America's integration experiment over the past 40 years, it may constitute a viable strategy for permitting Black Americans to obtain the space required to solve our schizophrenia over desegregation and to heal the deep psychological scars that have formed from 400 years of having European values superimposed on our minds and actions. Arguably, selected components of Black America have few prospects for advancement given current conditions and expected future trends. A new environment and new conditions could produce an upturn in these prospects.

If Black Americans can prepare chicken dinners and sell them to build mega churches (i.e., run a candy store) and rise up and become focused for the "big game," then we certainly have the capability of forming plans for, and operating, a state. At a minimum, we should consider building a consensus-based long-term strategic plan so that the generations to come do not have to bicker about, for example, whether the likes of Don Imus should or should not be fired. The basis for answers to such questions could be codified in a long-term strategic plan, which could be standard reading for Black adults and youth across the nation.

This paper leaves aside a detailed discussion of the following important questions that deserve good answers:

- Who is to be in charge of developing the plan?
- What should be the key components of the plan?
- Who should be responsible for updating the plan and the periodicity of those updates?
- Who is responsible for reporting out on the nation's progress vis-à-vis the plan?

For current purposes, it appears sufficient to offer a short answer to the first question in the set. Given that this paper was prepared for a National Economics Association (NEA) sponsored event, it is suggested that this esteemed organization take full responsibility for the design, development, maintenance, and reporting of a long-term strategic plan for Black America.

Assuming that NEA accepts this undertaking, it is comforting to state the following realities: State formation is a lot like running a candy store—just more complex; Black American leaders are, no doubt, as good at “making it up as we go along” as any other nation's leaders; and because it has not been done before, whatever is produced will be an improvement over what is now available.

### **When to Emigrate?**

If we were to rely on historical precedent, then 2049 could be a good year to initiate, continue, or end a significant emigration effort for Black Americans. At a minimum, we could consider establishing some definitive emigration action around that date. Why? Because a Biblical references (Exodus 12:40) points to a 430-year Hebrew sojourn. Given the Black Americans religious tradition of paralleling Black slavery in America with the reported Hebrew sojourn in Egypt, and that Black Americans are reported to have first arrived in the Virginia Colony as slaves in 1619, the aforementioned 430 years would conclude in 2049. Given its Biblical origin, it may be a date around which consensus might be built.

Realistically, the most logical milestone dates for all aspects of the long-term strategic plan for Black America, including milestones for emigration, are best determined in the context of the plan, and not force-fitted to dates with symbolic or mythical meaning. What we know is that wise persons write their history in advance and then take the action that is necessary to bring that history to life. A long-term strategic plan would enable Black Americans, for the first time, to at least have a plan with a timetable to seek to fulfill.

### **Conclusion**

Like the nations of the world, Black America, a 40 million-sized nation within a nation, stands at the threshold of change. Black American economic, political, and social realities present challenges almost too numerous to mention. On the other hand, these

challenges invite action by a people who know how to overcome. However, we should be wise in our actions and not thrash around haphazardly. Rather, we could develop a plan of action that could predict our future successes. We need not just any plan, but a long-term strategic plan that provides a framework for considering current and future questions and that could facilitate upwardly spiraling progress toward state formation.

One element of that plan may be to enhance our long-term strategic position in the world by emigrating. Historically, Black Americans have entertained that Africa was our ultimate destination. This paper reveals that, based on a survey with a very small sample, certain Black Americans continue to identify Africa as one of the most favored destination to emigrate—at least on a temporary basis. FERs permit a ranking of African nations that might be most desirable as a new home. Interestingly, the FERs for numerous African nations exceed the U.S. FER. Given a confluence of what may appear to be low-probability events, it may turn out that certain areas of the United States may come to constitute sites for Black American state formation.

It is important to keep a few key points in mind. First, ideas about emigrating to other nations are somewhat presumptuous because most nations do not view immigration favorably. Second, and somewhat countervailing to the first, Black Americans have already begun a process of emigration, albeit on a very small scale. Third, the focus on Africa as an emigration destination is based on an historical precedence; clearly there are other continents and countries that might provide very favorable opportunities for emigration (e.g., South America, Canada, etc.).

Admittedly, an important purpose of this paper is to provide the impetus for seriously considering the formation of a long-term strategic plan for Black America. If for no other reason than to consider ways to release, build up, make whole, and form a future for incarcerated Black Americans, we should consider developing such a plan and include prospects for emigration as part of it. A plan is needed, and it is needed now.

The NEA is well-positioned to take full responsibility for the development of a long-term strategic plan for Black America. It should not shirk from this important duty and opportunity. If not NEA, then whom? Let not history record NEA's failure to assume the challenge to design, develop, maintain, and report this plan for Black generations to come. Given what we have now, there is a guarantee of success in undertaking this effort. Otherwise, history might record, one-to-two centuries hence, a people who were taken from African shores, brought to America, used up and spit out like spent physical capital, and then recycled into a new people with no resemblance to their previous selves. Let not history say that these people forgot that they were present at the foundation of human history and that they helped bring the world into existence. If so, Black Americans would have become a people who lost their way and who missed the opportunity and the choice to enjoy the glory of returning to their former home—or identifying a new home where they could enjoy well-deserved and unconstrained opportunities to compete, build their economy and unique culture, and create a pleasant life for their progeny. Literally or figuratively, Black Americans need to build a framework for coming to Africa.

## References

- African Centre for Statistics (2006). *African Statistical Yearbook 2006*. U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. Retrieved from the Internet on August 28, 2007; [http://www.uneca.org/eca\\_programmes/policy\\_analysis/statistics/asyb.htm](http://www.uneca.org/eca_programmes/policy_analysis/statistics/asyb.htm).
- Bowers, Emily (2006). "Rebuilding a Part of Black History." *The Toronto Star*. August 9, 2006, p. AO-4.
- Clarke, John. "The African Mind." A videotaped lecture. Retrieved from the Internet on September 21, 2007; <http://mindwarz.com/media/node/75> .
- Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2005). "Interview With James J. Heckman." *The Region*. June. Retrieved from the Internet on November 15, 2007; <http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/05-06/heckman.cfm> .
- Finnish Social Science Data (2007). *FSD1289 Measures of Democracy 1810-2004*. Retrieved from the Internet on October 28, 2007; <http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/> .
- Galabuzi, Grace-Edward (2006). *Canada's Economic Apartheid: The Social Exclusion of Racialized Groups in the New Century*. Canadian Scholars' Press. Toronto, Canada.
- Gallup Organization (2007). "The Gallup Poll Weekly Briefing—October 12, 2007." The Gallup Organization. Princeton, NJ. (Received as an e-mail message on October 12<sup>th</sup>.)
- Gibbs, James, Harper, Gregory, Rubin, Marc, and Shin, Hyon (2003). "Evaluating Components of International Migration: Native Emigrants." Population Division Working Paper # 63. U.S. Census Bureau. Washington, DC.
- Howard, French and Polgreen, Lydia (2007A). "China, Filling a Void, Drills for Riches in Chad." *The New York Times*. August 13<sup>th</sup>. Retrieved from the Internet on August 13, 2007; [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/13/world/africa/13chinaafrica.html?\\_r1&th=&oref=slo...](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/13/world/africa/13chinaafrica.html?_r1&th=&oref=slo...)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007B). "Entrepreneurs From China Flourish in Africa." *The New York Times*. August 18<sup>th</sup>. Retrieved from the Internet on August 18, 2007; [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/18/world/africa/18malawi.html?\\_r=1&th=&oref=slogin...](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/18/world/africa/18malawi.html?_r=1&th=&oref=slogin...)
- Hughes, Timothy and Wilson, Doris (2003). "Reentry Trends in the United States." Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved from the Internet on October 30, 2007; <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/reentry.htm#highlights> .

- Jacobson, Michael (2007). "Testimony to a hearing of the Joint Economic Committee entitled 'Mass Incarceration in the United States: At What Cost?'" Retrieved from the Internet on October 4, 2007;  
<http://www.jec.senate.gov/Hearings/10.04.07%20Economic%20Cost%20of%20Incarceration/Testimony%20-%20Michael%20Jacobson.pdf> .
- Lawrence, Peter, Meigh, Jeremy, and Sullivan, Caroline (2003). The Water Poverty Index an International Comparison. *Keele Economic Research Papers*. Keele University. Keele, Staffordshire, UK. Retrieved from the Internet on October 18;  
<http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/kerp>.
- Marble, Manning (2001). "Racism, Prisons, and the Future of Black America." *PeaceWork Magazine*. Retrieved from the Internet on October 30, 2007;  
<http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/pwork/1200/122k05.htm> .
- Nichols, Stephen and Shergold, Peter (1989). "Unshackling the Past." In Stephen Nichols, editor, *Convict Workers: Reinterpreting Australia's Past*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, MA.
- Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007). *World Publics Welcome Global Trade – But Not Immigration*. Pew Research Center. Washington, DC.
- Polgreen, Lydia and Connelly, Marjorie (2007). "Poll Shows Africans Wary, but Hopeful About Future." *The New York Times*. July 25<sup>th</sup>. Retrieved from the Internet on July 24, 2007;  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/25/world/africa/25poll.html?\\_r=1&th=&oref=slogin&e...](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/25/world/africa/25poll.html?_r=1&th=&oref=slogin&e...)
- \_\_\_\_\_ and French, Howard (2007). "China's Trade in Africa Carries a Price Tag." *The New York Times*. August 21<sup>st</sup>. Retrieved from the Internet on August 21, 2007;  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21/world/africa/21zambia.html?\\_r=1&th=&emc=th&pa....](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21/world/africa/21zambia.html?_r=1&th=&emc=th&pa....)
- Robinson, Brooks (2007A). *BlackEconomics: A Primer*. BlackEconomics.org. Honolulu, HI. Retrieved from the Internet on October 1, 2007;  
<http://www.blackeconomics.org/>.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007B). "Media as Cause and Cure for Black American Vulnerabilities." A BlackEconomics.org Working Paper. Honolulu, HI. Retrieved from the Internet on October 1, 2007;  
<http://www.blackeconomics.org/page3.html>.
- Robinson, Randall (2005). *Quitting America*. Plume. New York, NY.

- Smiley, Tavis (2006). *The Covenant with Black America*. Third World Press. Chicago, IL
- Smith, Abbot (1965). *Colonists in Bondage: White Servitude and Convict Labor in America; 1607-1776*. Peter Smith. Gloucester, MA.
- The Conference Board (2000). *Business Cycle Indicators Handbook*. The Conference Board. New York, NY. Retrieved from the Internet on October 31, 2007; [http://www.conference-board.org/pdf\\_free/economics/bci/BCI-Handbook.pdf](http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/economics/bci/BCI-Handbook.pdf)
- The Economist (2007). "In God's Name: Special Report on Religion and Public Life." *The Economist*. Vol. 385, No. 8553, p. 20.
- The Economist Staff Writers (2007). "Stronger China." *The Economist*. Vol. 384, No. 8548; p. 14.
- U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (2007). *Mass Incarceration in the U.S.: At What Cost?* A JEC Hearing that was conducted on October 4<sup>th</sup>. Retrieved from the Internet on October 30, 2007; <http://www.jec.senate.gov/Hearings/10.04.07EconomicCostofIncarceration.htm> .
- U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007). "Table 2100.—Race of Reference Person: Shares of Average Annual Expenditures and Sources of Income, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2005." *2005 Consumer Expenditure Survey*. Retrieved from the Internet on September 22, 2007; <http://www.bls.gov/cex/2005/share/race.pdf>.
- U.S. Federal Reserve Board. (2004). *2004 Survey of Consumer Finances*. Federal Reserve Board. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from the Internet on September 22, 2007; <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2004/scf2004home.html>.
- Woodson, Carter (1968). *The Education of the Negro Prior to 1861*. Arno Press and the New York Times. New York, NY.
- Yarema, Allan (2006). *The American Colonization Society: An Avenue to Freedom?* University Press of America, Inc. Lanham, MD.

## **Appendix A: BlackEconomics.org Emigration Survey**

### **Purpose**

The BlackEconomics.org Emigration Survey was a non-probability sample survey that was designed to capture a snapshot of popular opinion among Black American college and university students concerning prospects for emigration. Given the focus of this paper on prospects for Black Americans to emigrate to Africa or elsewhere, it appeared appropriate to inquire of those who are likely to be most prepared to perform such emigration—irrespective of whether they were, in fact, inclined to do so. The results of the survey carry very limited inferential authority; the survey results can only be interpreted to infer the opinions of those surveyed. However, the total number of respondents (76) and the diverse geographical coverage of responses helps ensure that the results derived from the survey data satisfy certain requirements for statistical validity.

### **Methods**

During the latter two weeks of September 2007, BlackEconomics.org commissioned the development of a contact list of 50 leaders of Black Student Unions and other Black student organizations on arbitrarily selected private and public non-historically Black colleges, universities, and junior colleges. The list of 50 was augmented with leaders of an additional 16, mainly private and public universities. Finally, the list was augmented with leaders of Student Government Associations at six of the largest Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) (see the list in Table A1).

On October 8, 2007, a link to an Internet Web site that provided access to the BlackEconomics.org Emigration Survey (available from the author upon request) was transmitted to the aforementioned contacts by e-mail message (this correspondence is available from the author upon request).<sup>8</sup> Essentially, the contacts were invited to recruit the membership of their student organizations to participate in the survey, and were extended the opportunity to receive an incentive (\$100) depending on the level of survey participation by their membership. The survey period was from October 8<sup>th</sup> through October 21<sup>st</sup>.

After the survey period closed on October 21<sup>st</sup>, the author downloaded the survey data, tabulated them, and used them to estimate regression equations. Key survey results are provided in the body of this paper and in tables in this Appendix. (Complete survey results are available from the author upon request.)

---

<sup>8</sup> The BlackEconomics.org Immigration Survey was developed by the author, and was validated by three testers. Given the sensitivity and complexity of reporting ethnicity, one tester suggested a more open format for the survey question that requested ethnicity data, and the suggestion was adopted. Survey Monkey ([www.surveymonkey.com](http://www.surveymonkey.com)) served as the host for the BlackEconomics.org Emigration Survey.

Table A1—BlackEconomics.org Immigration Survey Sample

Colleges & Universities	Respon- dents	Colleges & Universities	Respon- dents
Amherst College	0	Stanford University	0
Berea College	0	State University of New York- Buffalo	0
Binghamton University	0	Trinity University	0
Cheyney University of Penn	0	University of Texas	0
Columbia University	0	<b>University of Alabama</b>	<b>1</b>
DePaul University	0	<b>University of Arizona</b>	<b>26</b>
Duke University	0	University of California-Berkeley	0
Emporia State University	0	University of California-Los Angeles	0
Franklin & Marshall College	0	University of Chicago	0
Franklin College	0	University of Delaware	0
<b>Garden City Community College</b>	<b>1</b>	University of Delaware	0
George Mason University	0	University of Illinois	0
Georgetown University	0	<b>University of Kansas</b>	<b>4</b>
Gettysburg College	0	University of Kentucky	0
Grambling State University	0	University of Maryland	0
<b>Harvard University</b>	<b>7</b>	University of Maryland	0
Hope College	0	University of Michigan	0
Howard University	0	University of Michigan	0
Hunter College - New York	0	University Of Minnesota	0
Illinois Wesleyan University	0	University of Minnesota Morris	0
<b>Indiana University</b>	<b>32</b>	University of Mississippi	0
Jackson State University	0	University Of Missouri-Kansas City	0
<b>Joliet Junior College</b>	<b>5</b>	University of New Mexico	0
Lewis & Clark College	0	University of North Carolina	0
Manchester College	0	University of Oregon	0
Monroe Community College	0	University of Pennsylvania	0
Morgan State University	0	University of South Carolina	0
Ohio State University	0	University of Southern California	0
Otterbein College	0	University of Tennessee	0
Pacific Lutheran University	0	University of Utah	0
Point Park University	0	University of Washington	0
Purdue University	0	University of Wisconsin	0
Rollins College	0	Waynesburg University	0
Santa Fe Community College	0	Wilberforce University	0
Seattle University	0	Wright State University	0
Sonoma State University	0	Xavier University of Louisiana	0

Table A2.—Logit Regression Results: (Model I)

Variables	Model A estimated parameters and t-statistics	Model B estimated parameters and t-statistics	Model C estimated parameters and t-statistics
Limited Dependent Variable: Respondent would Never Emigrate			
Age 1 (23-30)	-1.6037 (-1.9328)	-0.6288 (-0.6676)	-1.4176 (-1.6685)
Age 2 (31-40)	-0.29047 (-0.2306)	0.2903 (0.2133)	-0.2879 (-0.2222)
Age 3 (41-50)	0.5881 (0.5420)	0.3957 (0.2785)	0.6307 (0.5519)
Age 4 (51-65)	33.459 (0.000)	34.404 (0.000)	34.918 (0.0000)
GENDER	-0.4304 (-1.1209)	-0.3754 (-0.9447)	-0.4466 (-1.1458)
Respondent has traveled outside of the U.S.	-0.4938 (-0.8826)	-0.0207 (-0.0336)	-0.3814 (-0.6553)
College/University: East		-30.874 (-0.000)	
College/University: West		-1.577 (-1.8356)	
College/University: South		32.987 (0.000)	
College/University: Elite			-31.060 (-0.000)
College/University: Junior College			-0.4854 (-0.3453)
N	72	72	72
McFadden R <sup>2</sup>	0.0444	0.1438	0.0704
Log of Likelihood Function	-38.69	-34.668	-37.649
Percentage of Correct Predictions	0.6944	0.7361	0.6944
Durbin-Watson Statistic	20.387	2.1343	20.705

\*--Statistically significant at the five percent level

Table A3.—Logit Regression Results: (Model II)

Variables	Model A estimated parameters and t-statistics	Model B estimated parameters and t-statistics	Model C estimated parameters and t-statistics
Limited Dependent Variable: Respondent would Emigrate Permanently			
Age 1 (23-30)	0.60315 (0.8676)	0.6603 (0.8070)	0.63262 (0.8708)
Age 2 (31-4)	1.9237 (1.6162)	1.8741 (1.5257)	2.4685 (1.775)
Age 3 (41-50)	-33.221 (-0.000)	-32.753 (-0.000)	-32.533 (-0.000)
Age 4 (51-65)	-32.913 (-0.000)	-32.930 (-0.000)	-0.9742 (-0.000)
GENDER	-0.7396 (-1.8846)	-0.7226 (-1.812)	-0.7139 (-1.802)
Respondent has traveled outside of the U.S.	-1.3658* (-2.1051)	-1.3817* (-1.9739)	-1.2792 (-1.9186)
College/University: East		-0.49501 (-0.3668)	
College/University: West		0.07018 (0.0896)	
College/University: South		0.08736 (0.000)	
College/University: Elite			-0.5517 (-0.4494)
College/University: Junior College			-34.082 (-0.000)
N	72	72	72
McFadden R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0328	-0.0297	-0.0193
Log of Likelihood Function	-36.632	-36.523	-35.536
Percentage of Correct Predictions	0.7222	0.7222	0.75
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.5148	1.5116	1.5142

\*--Statistically significant at the five percent level

Table A4.—Logit Regression Results: (Model III)

Variables	Model A estimated parameters and t-statistics	Model B estimated parameters and t-statistics	Model C estimated parameters and t-statistics
Limited Dependent Variable: Respondent would Emigrate Temporarily			
Age 1 (23-30)	2.2507* (1.9711)	2.1731 (1.6952)	2.264 (1.9205)
Age 2 (31-40)	0.0247 (0.018)	0.0932 (0.0639)	0.3554 (0.2501)
Age 3 (41-50)	34.252 (0.000)	33.984 (0.000)	33.528 (0.000)
Age 4 (51-65)	31.787 (0.000)	32.73 (0.000)	34.336 (0.000)
GENDER	1.7845* (3.4409)	1.8409* (3.3635)	1.8469* (3.4168)
Respondent has traveled outside of the U.S.	-0.1333 (-0.1999)	-0.4381 (-0.6005)	-0.30976 (-0.4237)
College/University: East		32.86 (0.000)	
College/University: West		0.2576 (0.2797)	
College/University: South		10.52 (0.000)	
College/University: Elite			31.75 (0.000)
College/University: Junior College			-0.7914 (-0.4390)
N	72	72	72
McFadden R <sup>2</sup>	-0.1023	-0.060	-0.5749
Log of Likelihood Function	-25.313	-24.343	-24.284
Percentage of Correct Predictions	0.8333	0.8472	0.8611
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.7062	1.7386	1.7589

\*--Statistically significant at the five percent level

## Appendix B: Favorable for Immigration Rankings

### Purpose

The Favorable for Emigration Rankings (FERs) serve as relative measures of the change in existing conditions within African nations that signal the likelihood of successful emigration by Black Americans to these nations. The variables reflected in the FERs account for existing and future conditions within these countries that would facilitate or hinder smooth emigration and integration efforts. Generally, the variables reflect trends or changes in key indicators over the past five-to-six years (less, where data are unavailable) that indicate growth or improvement in conditions that would make the nations more suitable or favorable for emigration.

### Scope

While the FERs do not reflect all possible indicators of successful emigration and integration, they reflect key variables that have been traditionally used in popular and internationally recognized indexes that signal favorable or unfavorable conditions in nations. Decisions on which variables to include were determined, in part, by the availability of concurrent or nearly concurrent statistics, which were also complete or nearly complete for all of the nations under consideration.

### Sources and Method

FERS variables (see the variables and their definitions in Table B1 below) were obtained from three primary sources: The *African Statistical Yearbook 2006 (ASY)*; the Lawrence, Meigh, and Sullivan (2003) Keele Economic Research Paper entitled *The Water Poverty Index: An International Comparison (WPI)*; and from Finnish Social Science Data (FSD) on democratization.

The FERs were calculated using the following method, which was adapted from the Conference Board's methodology for preparing Leading, Lagging, and Coincident Economic Indicators of the United States.

### Weighted FERs

First, symmetric percentage changes were computed for each of the ASY variables  $i$  for each nation  $j$  over time period  $t$  (the latter dimension was primarily determined by the data presented in the ASY), using the following equation:

Equation 2

$$PC_{i,j,t} = 200 * \frac{(x_{i,j,t} - x_{i,j,t-1})}{(x_{i,j,t} + x_{i,j,t-1})}$$

Second, aggregation weights were computed for each variable using the following procedure:

- Compute the standard deviation of the percent changes for each time series variable  $i$  using the following equation:

**Equation 3**

$$SDPC_{i,j} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{t=1}^n (PC_{i,j} - \overline{PC_{i,j,t(t_1 \rightarrow t_n)}})^2}{(n-1)}}.$$

- Invert the standard deviation for each series  $i$  in the following way:

**Equation 4**

$$ISDPC_{i,j} = 1/SDPC_{i,j}.$$

- Prepare a scale factor for the  $i$  variables for each nation so that the inverted standard deviations sum to unity using the following equation; that is, prepare aggregation weights.

**Equation 5**

$$SF_{i,j} = ISDPC_{i,j} * \left( \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n (ISDPC_{i,j})} \right).$$

Third, apply the (aggregation weights for each  $i$ th variable to the related percentage changes to derive weighted percentage changes in the following way:

**Equation 6**

$$WPC_{i,j} = (PC_{i,j} * SF_{i,j}).$$

Fourth, compute values for the FER-I component for all  $j$  nations by aggregating the weighted percent changes using the following equation:

**Equation 7**

$$FER-I_j = (PC_{GDP_j} + PC_{Food_j} + ELEC_j + TELE_j - CPI_j - PC_{GSD_j} - PC_{DEBT_j} + PC_{TEACH_1_j} - LWA_j).$$

Fifth, compute values for the FER-II component for all  $j$  nations by executing the following computations for the three WPI variables:

- Sum the values of the variables (Resources, Access, and Uses)
- Prepare preliminary rank values for each nation by dividing each sum that was computed in the above step by the lowest sum that was computed.
- Prepare final rank values for each nation by converting the preliminary rank values to natural logarithms and sorting in descending order.

Sixth, use FSD on democratization for all  $j$  nations to compute values for the FER-III component by following the three-step procedure described above for computing the FER-I component.

Seventh, compute total FER values by summing the values derived in steps four (FER-I), five (FER-II), and six (FER-III) above. The resulting values can be sorted into descending rank order. Such ordering appears in Table B2 below along with values for the FER-I, II, and III components.

**Table B1—FERs Variables and Definitions**

Line No.	Code	Title	Definition
<i>Africa Statistical Yearbook 2006 Variables (FER-I)</i>			
1	PC GDP	Per capita gross domestic product	Countries gross domestic product in millions of U.S. dollars divided by the population (tables 1-1 and 2-1)
2	PC Food	Per capita Food production	An index of per capital food production with 1999-2001=100. (table 3-1)
3	ELEC	Electricity Production	Electricity, total production in millions of kilowatt hours (table 4-1)
4	TELE	Telephones in use	Number of telephones in use in thousands
5	CPI	Consumer Price Index	Consumer price index, all items, 2000=100 (table 7-1)
6	PC GSD	Per capital central government surplus or deficit	Government revenue (table 8-1-1) less expenditures (table 8-1-2) in million of U.S. dollars all divided by the population (table 1-1)
7	PC Debt	Per capital central government external debt	Government external debt (table 8-1-3) in millions of U.S. dollars divided by the population (table 1-1)
8	PC Teach I	Per capital teachers in level one schools	Teaching staff level 1 education (table 9-1-1) divided by the population (table 1-1)
9	LWA	Percentage of population with AIDS	Percentage of the population between the ages of 14-49 living with HIV AIDS (table 10)
<i>Water Poverty Index Variables (FER-II)</i>			
10	RESOURCES	Water resources	A measure of internal water resources and external water inflows
11	ACCESS	Water access	A measure of access to safe water, sanitation, and of a relationship between irrigated lands to water resources
12	USES	Water uses	A measure of domestic, industrial, and agricultural water use
<i>Finnish Social Science Data (FER-III)</i>			
13	DEMO	Democratization	A measure of political competition and participation

**Table B2—Weighted Favorable for Emigration Rankings (FERs)**

Line No.	Countries	Composite FERS	FERS-I (ASY Data)	FERS-II (WRAU)	FERS-III Democratization
1	Madagascar	10.249	9.235	0.667	0.347
2	Tunisia	3.672	2.918	0.591	0.164
3	Guinea	3.064	2.250	0.725	0.089
4	Cote d'Ivoire	2.039	1.676	0.452	-0.089
5	Cameroon	1.946	1.208	0.683	0.055
6	Algeria	1.801	1.437	0.573	-0.208
7	Lesotho	1.737	1.107	0.261	0.369
8	Senegal	1.464	1.016	0.448	0.000
9	Zimbabwe	1.462	0.852	0.561	0.049
10	Egypt	1.345	0.547	0.798	0.000
11	Mauritius	1.085	0.195	0.890	0.000
12	Equatorial Guinea	1.061	0.011	1.050	0.001
13	Comoros	1.058	0.670	0.370	0.017
14	Burundi	0.980	0.680	0.301	0.000
15	Botswana	0.920	0.243	0.616	0.061
16	Niger	0.827	0.561	0.296	-0.030
17	Congo	0.812	-0.002	0.812	0.002
18	U.S.	0.808	0.041	0.765	0.002
19	Mauritania	0.723	0.079	0.636	0.008
20	Sudan	0.723	0.004	0.719	0.000
21	Swaziland	0.718	-0.001	0.719	0.000
22	Kenya	0.697	0.218	0.496	-0.017
23	Central African Republic	0.640	0.176	0.547	-0.083
24	Rwanda	0.631	0.412	0.178	0.041
25	Burkina Faso	0.628	0.240	0.375	0.013
26	Mali	0.627	0.201	0.423	0.003
27	Benin	0.616	0.421	0.246	-0.051
28	Tanzania, United Republic of	0.590	0.063	0.528	0.000
29	Ethiopia	0.541	0.396	0.145	0.000
30	Guinea-Bissau	0.517	-0.183	0.700	0.000
31	Angola	0.505	0.104	0.401	0.000
32	Togo	0.484	0.046	0.435	0.003
33	Ghana	0.469	0.087	0.366	0.016
34	Gambia	0.437	-0.090	0.543	-0.016
35	Chad	0.378	0.144	0.251	-0.017
36	Nigeria	0.376	-0.248	0.496	0.128
37	South Africa	0.329	-0.128	0.594	-0.137
38	Uganda	0.308	-0.008	0.315	0.001
39	Malawi	0.268	0.010	0.271	-0.014
40	Mozambique	0.235	0.073	0.189	-0.027
41	Democratic Republic of Congo	-0.082	-0.632	0.550	0.000
42	Gabon	-0.378	-1.427	0.890	0.159
43	Morocco	-0.484	-1.085	0.569	0.032
44	Zambia	-1.721	-2.563	0.716	0.126
45	Liberia	-4.143	-3.821	0.000	-0.323

FERs were not computed for the following countries due to data unavailability: Cape Verde, Djibouti, Eritrea, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Namibia; Sao Tome and Principe; Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. Where feasible, values were imputed for missing data.

## Unweighted FERs

Unweighted FERs were computed using the following methodology:

- First, prepare symmetric percentage changes for each of the ASY variables  $i$  for each nation  $j$  over time period  $t$  ( see equation:2).
- Compute the mean percent change for each  $i$ th ASY variable.
- Use equation 7 above the compute component I of the unweighted FERs.
- Compute total Unweighted FERs by combining the unweighted FER-I component with the FER-II and FER-III components that were described above.

Table B3 below provides unweighted FERs in rank order along with values for the related FER-I, II, and III component values.

**Table B3—Unweighted Favorable for Emigration Rankings (FERs)**

Line No.	Countries	Composite FERS	FERS-I (ASY Data)	FERS-II (WRAU)	FERS-III Democratization
1	Congo	238.498	190.559	0.812	47.126
2	Togo	182.087	175.370	0.435	6.281
3	Botswana	145.128	137.167	0.616	7.346
4	South Africa	132.576	135.630	0.594	-3.648
5	Madagascar	130.742	127.286	0.667	2.790
6	Comoros	107.194	56.824	0.370	50.000
7	Lesotho	107.003	64.269	0.261	42.473
8	Guinea	68.700	56.087	0.725	11.887
9	Burkina Faso	67.250	49.787	0.375	17.089
10	Cameroon	57.997	28.743	0.683	28.571
11	Nigeria	54.436	49.886	0.496	4.054
12	Mali	53.009	41.872	0.423	10.714
13	Morocco	46.357	39.744	0.569	6.044
14	Ethiopia	41.461	41.316	0.145	0.000
15	Rwanda	38.613	-11.565	0.178	50.000
16	Tunisia	30.836	-0.487	0.591	30.733
17	Ghana	29.719	23.342	0.366	6.012
18	Burundi	29.632	29.331	0.301	0.000
19	Equatorial Guinea	29.295	-8.922	1.050	37.168
20	Gabon	27.709	23.330	0.890	3.488
21	Zimbabwe	25.544	13.879	0.561	11.104
22	Chad	22.230	23.468	0.251	-1.489
23	Zambia	17.856	-11.086	0.716	28.226
24	Senegal	17.481	17.033	0.448	0.000
25	Malawi	12.507	17.117	0.271	-4.881
26	Niger	10.258	11.663	0.296	-1.701
27	Algeria	5.929	20.323	0.573	-14.967

Line No.	Countries	Composite FERS	FERS-I (ASY Data)	FERS-II (WRAU)	FERS-III Democratization
28	Guinea-Bissau	5.129	4.430	0.700	0.000
29	Egypt	-0.949	-1.747	0.798	0.000
30	Angola	-6.676	-7.078	0.401	0.000
31	Mozambique	-9.273	5.681	0.189	-15.143
32	Tanzania, United Republic of	-12.240	-12.768	0.528	0.000
33	Uganda	-19.587	-22.258	0.315	2.356
34	Swaziland	-24.776	-25.495	0.719	0.000
35	Benin	-29.470	-10.575	0.246	-19.141
36	U.S.	-48.178	-49.016	0.765	0.072
37	Cote d'Ivoire	-58.665	-50.124	0.452	-8.993
38	Democratic Republic of Congo	-63.267	-63.817	0.550	0.000
39	Liberia	-64.847	-14.847	0.000	-50.000
40	Central African Republic	-68.339	-18.886	0.547	-50.000
41	Gambia	-72.985	-57.813	0.543	-15.715
42	Kenya	-74.285	-74.115	0.496	-0.667
43	Mauritius	-103.022	-103.912	0.890	0.000
44	Mauritania	-112.532	-129.917	0.636	16.749
45	Sudan	-170.665	-171.384	0.719	0.000

FERs were not computed for the following countries due to data unavailability: Cape Verde, Djibouti, Eritrea, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Namibia; Sao Tome and Principe; Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. Where feasible, values were imputed for missing data.